Our wounded Lebanon has persistently risen above its ever-deepening scars through countless manifestations of resilience… Through its engagement with the Arab world and adaptation to global developments, the nation recognized the crucial significance of this accelerating international momentum turning in its direction. Accordingly, on 18 September 2008, the Lebanese Parliament enacted Law No. (18) Establishing the Special Economic Zone in the city of Tripoli – Northern Lebanon – which historical evidence, political realities, and social dynamics collectively affirm its status as Lebanon’s enduring economic capital – for as long as Lebanon endures. Indeed, we state without exaggeration that Tripoli – with its refined social fabric, authentic civilizational values, and promising economic potential – constitutes the true headquarters of Lebanon’s Special Economic Zone. This is a national institution serving all Lebanon, not merely a regional economic entity with constrained horizons imposed by transient power dynamics. At minimum, this designation ensures Tripoli’s trajectory diverges from that of its majestic Karami Exhibition – that solemn monument to visions lost not through unjust laws alone, but more fundamentally through the moral failings of those entrusted with their execution.

Most recently in 2025, the Lebanese Parliament enacted Law No. (2) Establishing Special Economic Zones for Technology Industries, published in the Official Gazette No. 22 dated 16 May 2025. To our knowledge, the agenda of relevant parliamentary committees currently includes numerous legislative proposals for creating additional economic zones across the nation: In the city of Batroun, in the districts of Tyre and Zahle, and the governorate of Baalbek-Hermel.

Guided by the intellectual traditions and ethical principles of constructive critique inherent to our Tripolitan roots – always seeking to refine approaches for the common good – we shall briefly pause (as this occasion permits) to examine the legal framework governing Special Economic Zones. Our analysis will consider both existing and proposed regulations that inevitably influence these zones’ operational cadence and their ability to achieve sustainable development objectives.

First: The nationwide implementation of Special Economic Zones across all Lebanese governorates is an admirable approach; one which we strongly endorse and repeatedly advocate. However, this must be guided by developmental, complementary visions rather than politically driven competition (though completely depoliticizing the process remains challenging), priority consideration of each location’s unique characteristics and circumstances, and true value-added impact, ensuring these zones fulfill their intended purpose as pioneering hubs that drive sustainable development and tangible society prosperity. Consequently, we urgently call for the alignment of Article (17) of Law No. (18) of 2008 with its counterparts in Law No. (2) of 2025 and in all other proposed legislation, while drawing attention to the actual benefit in excluding tourism services from SEZ activities in a city ranked among the most beautiful coastal areas of the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, we call for profound discussions on expanded decentralization in licensing tech activities and for an objective and abstract approach in determining institutional authority post-promulgation of Law No. (2) of 2025, in recognition of Tripoli SEZ’s qualitative leap through the “Knowledge and Innovation City” project – approved years ago by the Lebanese Cabinet – which allocated 75,000 sqm of the Rashid Karami International Exhibition grounds to attract investments in knowledge-based services and innovation.

Second: The success of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) hinges on “discipline” in the regulatory framework governing its establishment, operational nature, and its management methodologies. In fact, the best international practices recommend that a unified legal and regulatory framework exists to govern the economic zones, and which replaces fragmented laws which often create disparities in rights and privileges and obligations and compliance requirements. Similar to many advanced countries who avoid establishing separate legislation for each economic zone and opt for a unified law governing the operations of all economic zones. In addition, the Executive Authority is often granted the powers to establish SEZs as may be needed, provided that local authorities play a pioneering role through integrated visions for expanded administrative decentralization – which is often called upon.

Third: Despite the widely recognized adverse circumstances, the Lebanese Special Economic Zone (SEZ), headquartered in Tripoli, has achieved extraordinary milestones within a remarkably short timeframe – spanning structural, institutional, operational, strategic, and marketing dimensions. In efforts to strengthen its legal framework, Decree No. 12771 (dated 20/12/2023) concerning the “Staff Regulations of the Tripoli SEZ Authority” was recently published in Official Gazette No. 2 (11/1/2024). We must, however, raise a pressing concern: To what extent does Article 6 of Law No. 2 (2025) align with the provisions of this new Decree – and with anticipated legislation still under discussion?

Fourth: To build upon ongoing efforts to regulate existing and planned Special Economic Zones (SEZs), we propose developing a comprehensive set of evaluation indicators to serve in measuring success in achieving stated objectives, determining the necessity in improving its services, and evaluating whether an SEZ is needed or not. In the Russian Federation, for instance, the effectiveness of all Special Economic Zones (SEZs) – including industrial production zones, innovation technology zones, tourism and recreation zones, etc. – is assessed through six key indicators: investment attractiveness, business environment, infrastructure, natural resources, investment activities for SEZ residents, and information transparency. Four additional indicators have been added for assessment encompassing 18 detailed sub-metrics, including: SEZ resident performance, federal, regional, and local-level return on investment (ROI) across sectors such as engineering, transport, social services, innovation and infrastructure, SEZ objectives, performance of administrative authorities in SEZs, and planning efficacy for establishing new SEZs. Whereas in China – the global pioneer in Special Economic Zones – the performance of High-Tech Development Zones (HTDZs) undergoes regular assessment through a comprehensive set of indicators categorized into four core dimensions: Technological knowledge, structural optimization capacity, global competitiveness engagement, sustainable development, and innovation capability – an additional indicator arising from scientific and technological development. Meanwhile, the Economic and Technological Development Zone (ETDZ) is evaluated through five main categories: industrial capacity, technological innovation, regional integration, environmental protection, and administrative efficiency – which encompasses fifty-three indicators, including: Industrial output, revenues, productivity, gross domestic product (GDP), research and development expenditure, inflow of foreign direct investments, foreign trade value, and number of listed companies; in addition to sustainability indicators such as: number of vocational training institutions, energy and water consumption, and waste recycling rate. In the context of addressing contemporary challenges, the Sustainable Development Indicators (and their 17 goals) – adopted by the United Nations in 2015 – have gained significant importance in verifying the effectiveness of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and ensuring their alignment with the broader goal of sustainable public welfare for human communities. In this regard, the Global Alliance of Special Economic Zones (GASEZ) launched the “Model Zones Partnership for the SDGs” initiative in 2023. This initiative aims to raise awareness about the contributions of SEZs to sustainable development, identify leading zones in this field, and highlight best practices that can inspire and be replicated by other SEZs. According to the Investment Promotion and Facilitation Monitor report issued by UNCTAD in December 2024, 88% of surveyed SEZs prioritize SDG 9 (industry, innovation, and fundamental structures). In this regard, it’s important to note Lebanon’s focus on the knowledge and innovation sector since 2008—a commitment further reinforced through 2025 as previously noted. In reference to environmental protection and climate change (SDG 13), 64% of zones have treated it as a priority; and an identical percentage of zones have prioritized good health and wellbeing (SDG 3). Continuing in the same context, SDG 4 (Quality Education) is prioritized by 62% of the zones. According to the report, the general goals are fundamentally central to SEZ activities such as SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth) receiving attention from over 82% of the zones, and SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities) prioritized by 79%. Collectively, these findings clearly demonstrate how Special Economic Zones have come to embody comprehensive civilizational values in the global perspective – both in their conceptual foundations and their societal impact.

Fifth: It is an established fact – one that cannot be overlooked or ignored – that alternative dispute resolution (ADR) systems serve as a pivotal factor in stimulating investment. These mechanisms provide essential guarantees and diverse advantages that balance respect for state sovereignty with alleviating investors’ concerns. Therefore, we find it perplexing that Lebanon’s SEZ laws have explicitly omitted any reference to dispute resolution mechanisms. Neither Law No. 18 (2008) nor Law No. 2 (2025) includes disciplined provisions on this matter – despite the existence of leading international models worthy of consideration. Among these models is the International Commercial Court (ICC), which, as specialized global studies indicate, has emerged as the sole legitimate “competitor” to arbitration, or at the very least in the interim period.